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RISK  AVERSION  IN n-PERSON  BARGAINING 
ABSTRACT.  Relations between risk properties of Pareto optimal n-person bargaining 
solutions are studied. The  (weak)  worse alternative property, risk sensitivity property, 
and risk profit opportunity property are considered, in particular relations between these 
properties, and between these properties and other properties such as independence of 
irrelevant  alternatives and  individual  monotonicity.  A  distinction is  made  between 
bargaining  games  where  all Pareto optimal outcomes are riskless, and bargaining games 
where Pareto optimal outcomes may represent the utilities of lotteries between riskless 
alternatives. In the first mentioned case, more general results can be obtained. 
1.  INTRODUCTION,  DEFINITIONS,  PRELIMINARIES 
The  purpose  of this  paper  is  to  study the effects of replacing a  player in a 
bargaining  game  by  a  more  risk  averse  player, both  in terms of underlying 
alternatives and of utilities, and both for the mentioned player and his more 
risk averse  substitute,  and  for  the  other  players. These  effects will be con- 
sidered in the bargaining model as originally proposed by John Nash (1950), 
who  described the bargaining process by means of a bargaining solution, i.e., 
a  map which assigns to every possible bargaining game within a  certain class 
of bargaining games, a feasible outcome of that game. 
Let  us  first  introduce  the  notion  'more  risk  averse'.  Therefore,  let,  for 
some q E  N, A  be a  non-empty compact subset of R q.  Regard A  as a set of 
riskless alternatives for decision makers￿9 One can think of A  as of a collection 
of commodity bundles, each bundle specifying quantities of q  commodities. 
Let L(A)  denote the set of finite lotteries on A.  A typical element l of L(A) 
has the form 
￿9  =  [  ail  m  l  =  [pl,al;p2, a2; ....  pm,a m]  LPf,  If=l, 
where  m  EI~, p E  R m  such  that p  ~> 0,  ~m  =  =  v-1 Pi  1,  and  a i E A  for  all i 
1,2,...,  m.  Of course, I denotes the lottery which results with probability Pz 
in alternative a i. By identifying the riskless alternative a @A with the lottery 
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[1, a],  we  have A  C L(A). Elements  of L(A)LA are called risky alternatives. 
We assume that  a  decision maker's preferences on L(A) are represented by a 
utility function u: L(A) -* R satisfying 
(U.1)  u(l)=  ~l  piu(a  i)  foreveryl=  [Pi, aJ]~n=l ~ L(A), 
(U.2)  the restriction of u to A  is continuous. 
Property  (U.1)  states  that  the  utility  function  u is  linear  on  lotteries,  or, 
equivalently,  assigns  to  each  lottery  its  expected  utility.  Thus,  u  is  a 
yon Neumann-Morgenstern  utility  function.  Property  (U.2)  serves  mathe- 
matical  convenience.  If by  U(A) we  denote  the  family  of all  utility  func- 
tions  u:L(A)-+  R satisfying  (U.1)and  (U.2),  we  are  sufficiently  equipped 
to  give  the  following  definition  which  defines  a  partial  ordering  on  U(A) 
with respect to risk aversion. 
DEFINITION.  Let u, vE U(A).  We call (a decision maker with utility  func- 
tion)  v  more  risk averse  than  (a  decision  maker  with  utility  function)  u 
(notation:  vMR u) if there  exists  a  continuous  increasing concave function 
k: conv(u(A)) ~  R  such that v(a) = k o u(a) for all a EA. 
In words,  we call a  decision maker with utility function v more risk averse 
than  a  decision maker with utility function u  if v is a  continuous  increasing 
concave transformation  of u  on A, the  set of riskless alternatives. If we have 
a  function  k  as  in  the  definition,  then  only its restriction  to u(A) matters: 
note  that,  by  (U.1),  conv(u(A)) =  u(L(A)),  so u(L(A)) is completely deter- 
mined  by u(A), and, similarly, v(L(A))is completely determined  by v(A)= 
k(u(A)). We adopt the  convention that k o u(l) denotes  the expected utility 
of l EL(A)\A. The measure  of risk aversion given in the above definition is 
implicit  in  the  work  of Arrow (1963)  and  Pratt (1964),  and Kihlstrom and 
Mirman (1974).  For more details  we refer to Peters and Tijs (1981), where a 
modification  of Yaari's approach  [Yaari (1969)]  is used.  In this approach, a 
decision maker v is called more risk averse than a decision maker u if u prefers 
at  least  as  many lotteries  to each riskless alternative  as v does.  This remark 
may give  more  intuitive  insight  into  the  notion  'more risk averse' than the 
above  definition  (which  gives  a  mathematically  easier  to  handle  characteri- 
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If the number of decision makers is greater than  1, a bargaining problem 
may arise.  Let n E N, n >  1.  Formally, an n-person bargaining situation is an 
(n +  2)-tuple  P =  (A,  d,  u 1, u 2 ....  , u n) where A  is  a  set  of riskless alter- 
natives  as  above  (compact,  non-empty),  ~7  is  an  element  of A  called  the 
disagreement alternative,  and u ~ E U(A) for every i =  1, 2 ....  , n. The game- 
theoretic  interpretation  of  such  a  bargaining  situation  P  is,  that  there  are 
n players bargaining over the  set of lotteries L(A), each player i according to 
his  preferences  represented  by u i.  Only unanimous agreements are allowed, 
in other words, each player has a right to put his veto on any agreement. So 
no coalitions,  except  for the grand coalition N  := {1, 2 .....  n} consisting of 
all players, are allowed. If no unanimous agreement is reached, then the game 
ends in the disagreement alternative d. 
When we consider an n-person bargaining situation F =  (,4, d, u 1, u 2 ..... 
u n)  we  assume,  in  the  sequel,  that  the  following restrictions  are  satisfied 
(unless explicitly stated otherwise). 
(S.1)  ui(~i)  =  0  for every i EN. 
(S.2)  ui(a) >/0  for every i EN and a EA. 
(S.3)  u(a) := (ul(a), u2(a) ....  , un(a)) >  0  for some a EA. 
(S.4)  For every i E N, there exists an a i E A  with ui(a i) =  max {ui(a): 
aEA}anduJ(al)=O  for each] :/: i. 
Property  (S.1)  involves  a  normalization  of the  disagreement  alternative  in 
utility space to zero and is, in general, not a serious restriction in the bargain- 
ing model  which  we  are  developing.  It  may be justified  by appealing to an 
axiom of translation  invariance for bargaining solutions (see below). Property 
(S.2), which states that every alternative  is at least as good for each player as 
disagreement,  sometimes does represent a serious restriction.  Some comments 
on  this  are  given in  the  sequel,  especially  Section  4. Property (S.3) simply 
states  that  every player has an incentive to bargain,  and together with (S.1) 
implies that there are at least  two different alternatives in A. Property (S.4) 
is  included  to  enable  us  to  conclude  property  ((3.3)  for bargaining  games, 
below.  If we already require  (S.1) and (S.2), then requiring (S.4) represents 
no  serious  extra  restriction.  By BS n,  we  denote  the  family  of all n-person 
bargaining situations P = (A, d, u 1, u 2, ...,  u n) satisfying (S.1)-(S.4). 
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S r  := conv{u(a): a EA}  =  {u(1): tEL(A)}. 
Note, that S := Sr has the following properties: 
(G.1)  S is a non-empty, convex and compact subset of R'* with 0 E S, 
(G.2)  SCR n (:= {x E Rn: x >~ O}) and S is of full dimension, 
(G.3)  forallxESandyER  n withO<,y<~x, wehaveyES. 
All  these properties follow simply from properties of the constituting com- 
ponents  of P  and (S.1)-(S.4).  We  call  Sr  the  (n-person)  bargaining game 
corresponding  to  the  (n-person)  bargaining situation  r.  More generally, we 
call a set S satisfying (G.1)-(G.3) an n-person  bargaining game.  (Sometimes 
in the sequel, we will use the expression 'bargaining game' for a set S satisfy- 
ing only (G.1), and when doing so we will explicitly mention it.) S is called 
the set of feasible outcomes,  and  0  the disagreement outcome.  The  game- 
theoretic interpretation of a game S is similar to that of a bargaining situation 
1-'. By B n, we denote the family of all n-person bargaining games. 
Following  Nash  (1950),  we  will  represent  the  bargaining  process  by 
specifying some solution concept. Let B* be some subset orb n. 
DEFINITION.  An n-person  bargaining solution on B* is a map ~b: B* ~  R n 
with ~(S) E S for every S EB*. 
By specifying such a bargaining solution, we circumvent the difficult task 
of giving  a  detailed  description of an  actual bargaining process.  We simply 
assign  a  feasible outcome to every bargaining game in a family B* (possibly 
B* = B n) and assume that such an assignment procedure (bargaining solution) 
captures all relevant (according to us) features of the bargaining process. 
Let ~: B* ~  R n be a bargaining solution and BS*  := {P EBSn: Sr EB*}. 
Let  "~ : BS* ~  R n  be  defined by ~(F) := ~Sr) for every r  EBS*. By con- 
sidering this map ~  (which we also call a bargaining solution), we explicitly 
bring out the notion -  which is implicitly present in the definition of a bar- 
gaining solution  -  that  a  bargaining solution depends only on a bargaining 
game, i.e., on the image of a bargaining situation in utility space, and not on 
the specific structure of the underlying bargaining situation. So we can write 
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image  in  utility  space,  of course  has  some  advantages  in  the  resulting  sim- 
plicity of the model, but it also leads to paradoxes such as Shapley's impossi- 
bility  result  with  respect  to  the  use of ordinal utility functions  in 2-person 
bargaining  [see  Shapley  (1969)].  We will briefly mention  another  'paradox' 
with respect to the present paper, in the last section. 
Let us return  to the notion of risk aversion. We have sufficiently far intro- 
duced  our bargaining model to be able to state  the main problem to be con- 
sidered in this paper. Let P  =  (A, tT, u 1, u 2 ....  , u n ) be a bargaining situation. 
Suppose  we  replace  player  1,  who  has  utility  function  u 1,  by a  more  risk 
averse player with utility  function  k o u 1 where k: conv(u1(A))~  R is a con- 
tinuous  increasing concave function.  Suppose a  bargaining solution ~ is given 
defined  on a  suitable  family of bargaining games or, equivalently, bargaining 
situations  including  F  as  well  as  I" =  (A, ~, k o u 1, u 2 ....  , un).  Note  that 
every  player iEN\{1}  is the  same in I" and  P', that is, has the  same utility 
function,  and  therefore,  it  makes  sense  to  compare  q~i(P) with  ~i(P'),  i.e., 
the  utilities  assigned  by  ~  to  player  i  in  both  games.  However,  we  cannot 
compare ~I(P) with ~I(F') since player 1 in P  is a different player than player 
1 in P', and we cannot compare yon Neumann-Morgenstern  utility functions 
of different  players, since such a utility function is (a) unique (representation 
of  given preferences)  only  up  to  positive  linear  transformations  [see,  e.g., 
Herstein  and  Milnor  (1953)].  So  there  is  no  sense  in  comparing  any  value 
taken  by u ~ with any value taken by k o u 1. We can, however, compare the 
alternatives in L(A)  with utilities  (for player 1 in P and F') r  and r 
both  for  player  1  in  P  and  for  player  1  in  P'.  That  is,  if UP)=  u(l)  and 
UP') =  u'(m)  (where  u' =  (k o u 1, u 2 ....  , un))  for l, m  EL(A),  we can try 
to compare l and m  for player 1 in P, and for player 1 in P'. 
Formally,  these  considerations  are  condensed  in  three  properties  for 
bargaining  solutions.  Before stating these properties, we need some additional 
notation.  For P  =  (A,&  u 1, u 2 ....  , u n) @ BS n,  and  i EN,  let Ci(P) denote 
the  family of all continuous  increasing concave functions k: conv(ui(A)) ~ 
with  k(0)=0.  Let,  for  kiECi(P),  KI(F):=(A,~,u  I .....  ui-l,kiou  i, 
ui§  . . . , un).  Then Ki(I ') EBS  n, and Ki([ ")  is derived  from P  by replacing 
player  i  with  utility  function  u i  by the  more risk averse player with utility 
function k i o u i. 
Further,  let BS*  be a  subset  of BS n  which is closed  under  operations  of 
the  form K i,  and  let  4: BS* ~  R n  be  a  bargaining  solution.  For i EAr, the 52  HANS  PETERS  AND  STEF TIJS 
map 7r_i: R n ~  R n-1  assigns to a vector x E  R" the vector ~r_i(x ) =  (xl, ￿9 ￿9 ￿9 
xi-l, xi+x .....  Xn) which is obtained from x  by deleting the i-th coordinate. 
Let  PEBS*.  Then  the  opportunity  set  O_I(F,r  for the  bargainers j-~i 
with respect to I" and r  is defined by 
o_~(r', ~) := ~r_~ {x ~Sr:  xi = ~i(Sr)}. 
The  opportunity  set  O_i(P, q~) consists of those utility (n -- 1)-tuples, avail- 
able for the collective N\ {i}, if bargainer i receives ~bi(Sr). We are now ready 
to state the three announced properties. 
(P.1)  We say that ~: BS*  -+ R n has the worse alternative property (WA) 
if for every P  =  (A, ~, u a, u 2, ...,  un),  i EN  and k i E  Ci(['),  we 
have 
(i)  ui(l) >1 ui(m) for all l, m  E L(A ) with u(l) =  O(F) and 
(ul (m ) ....  , kl o ui(m ), . . . , un(m ) ) =  O(Ki(F)). 
(ii)  k i o ui(1) >1 k i o ui(m) for some I and m as in (i). 
(P.2)  We say that ~: BS*  -+ R n has the risk profit opportunity  property 
(RPO) if for every F E BS*, i E N, k ~ E  Ci(p), we have 
o_,<p, ~) c  o_~(K~(I'), r 
(P.3)  We  say  that  ~: BS*-+R  n  is  risk  sensitive  (RS)  if for  every 
P GBS*,  iEN  and  k i ~Ci(p),  we  have  Oj(Ki(p))~> Os(F)  for 
every ] E N, ] 4  = i. 
Thus, to put it differently while retaining the same notations as above, the 
worse alternative property states that, from his own pointof view, player i in F 
considers  his  more  risk  averse  substitute  player i  in KS(I  ") to  be worse off 
than he is; and also, alternatives (in L(A)) yielding the solution outcomes in 
I" and KI(I  ") can be found such that player i in Ki(P) considers himself to be 
worse  off than  player  i in F. (There is, thus, an assymetry in (i) and (ii) of 
property (P.1), which we will discuss further in the final section.)The other 
two  properties  contain  statements  in  terms  of utilities,  for  the  opposing 
bargainers ]4= i.  The risk profit opportunity property states that the oppor- 
tunity  set  for  the  collective N\ {i}  does  not  decrease,  the  risk  sensitivity 
axiom states that all players in N\ {i} benefit, if player i is replaced by a more 
risk averse player. The risk sensitivity property was introduced in Kihlstrom 
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The  main  purpose  of this  paper is,  to  establish  some  relations between 
properties  (P.1)-(P.3)  and  some  other  properties  for bargaining  solutions. 
In  Section  2,  relations  between  properties  (P.1)-(P.3)  will be proved for 
solutions,  defined  on  a  well-behaved  (w.r.t  concave  transformations),  but 
limited class of games, namely games in which every Pareto-optimal outcome 
is  riskless,  i.e.,  is  a  utility n-tuple of a riskless alternative. In Section 3, the 
results  of Section  2  are  illustrated by examples of solutions satisfying well- 
known  properties like independence  of irrelevant alternatives and individual 
monotonicity.  Section  4  studies  a  wider  class  of games,  including  games 
where  Pareto  optimal  outcomes may be risky (i.e., not riskless); the results 
in that section will not be as complete as the ones in the preceding sections. 
Section  5  concludes  with  some  final  comments.  References to the existing 
literature will be given where these fit in best. 
We  conclude  this  section  with  a  few results  which  state  some  relations 
between  properties  (P.1)-(P.3)  and  some  elementary  other  axioms  for 
bargaining solutions. 
For  SEB n,  P(S):={xES:  for  allyES  with  y~>x,  we havey=x} 
denotes  the  Pareto  optimal  subset  of S.  We  call  a  bargaining  solution  r 
Pareto  optimal  (PO)  if r  for  every S  in  its  domain.  An element 
t E R n  (i.e.,  t >  0)  is called a scale transformation.  For x E R n, we denote 
tx  := (tlxl, t2x2, ...  , tnXn)  and  for SC ~n,  we  denote  tS := {tx:x ES}. 
If  X ER+,  then  Lx := (k, k ....  , k)x and  LS := {Xx: x ES}.  A  solution  r 
is  called  scale  transformation  invariant  (STI)  if  r  t$(S)  for  all  S 
and  tS  in  its  domain,  where  t E  n  The  STI property requires a solution 
to  be  invariant  with  respect  to  changes  of  scale,  reflecting  the  fact  that 
von Neumann-Morgenstern  utility functions are unique  up to positive linear 
transformations.  The  disagreement  outcome  has  already  been  normalized 
to 0. 
A  solution  r  is  called  consistent  (Con) if for all F  and 14' in its domain 
and  every  i~N,  we  have:  O_i(F, 0) =  O_t(P', r  =~r  =  ~j(P')  for 
all ] EN\  {i}. (Note  that  we  do  not  distinguish  between  r  B* --r R n  and 
"r : BS* ~  R n.)  The  consistency  axiom  thus  states  that,  if the  opportunity 
sets  in  two  bargaining  games  (or  situations)  for  the  collective N\{i}  are 
equal,  then  every player  in  that  collective gets  the  same utility in the two 
games. 
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BS n  of n-person bargaining  situations,  which is  closed under operations of 
the form K i, and hence also under scale transformations. Our first result is 
1.1.  THEOREM.  Suppose ~ is Pareto optimal and has the risk profit oppor- 
tunity property. Then, for every P E BS*, every i E N  and every k i E Ci(F), 
we  have  either Cj(P)= ~bj(K/(P)  for every ]EN\{i}  or  there  exists some 
j EN\ {i} with ~bi(P) <  (gi(Ki(I')). 
Proof  Let  P E BS*,  i EN,  k i E ci(F),  and  suppose  ~bt(F  ) 4: r 
for  some  I EN,  14= i.  The proof is  finished if ~j(P)< r  for some 
j EN, j q: i. Suppose not, i.e., r  r  for all j ~N\  {i}. By RP0, 
0_i(F, ~b) C O_i(Ki(r), ~),  hence rr_/(C(r))E O_i(Ki(r), ~b), so n_i(C(P)) = 
lr_i(r  in view of P0 and r  ~bj(Ki(F))for allj EN\ {i}. But this 
contradicts our initial assumption Ct(F) 4: ~(Ki(F)).  [] 
Thus,  Theorem  1.1  says  that,  if  in  a bargaining  situation a  player i  is 
replaced by a more risk averse one, then a PO and RPO solution assigns either 
the  same  utilities to every other player in both situations, or assigns higher 
utility to at  least  one player in the new situation. In other words, either at 
least one player benefits, or no player (4: i) is worse off. 
The following theorem is an n-person analogon of a theorem in Kihlstrom 
et al.  (1981,  Theorem 4) which says  that  a two-person bargaining solution 
satisfies  STI if it satisfies RS and PO. Only, for the n-person case we do not 
need the risk sensitivity axiom. 
t.2.  THEOREM.  Suppose r  has the risk profit opportunity property and is 
Pareto optimal and consistent. Then q~ is scale transformation invariant. 
Proof.  Let P E BS* and t E  n  We have to prove  ~§ 
(1.1)  •(tSr)  =  tq~(Sr). 
Multiplying as  well as  dividing the  i-th  coordinates of Rn-vectors by t~ are 
continuous,  increasing  concave  transformations,  therefore  applying  RPO 
twice gives 
(1.2)  O_i(P, ~)  =  O_i(Ti(P), (~)  for every i EN, 
where  T i  is the operation corresponding to t i E Ci(p) and t i corresponds to 
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Now (1.2), the linearity of t i and PO imply t~i(r) =  ti(~bi(r)) = r 
for every i ~ N, hence 
(1.3)  ti~bi(Sr)  =  ~bi((1, 1 .....  l,t i,  1 ....  ,1)Sr)foreveryiEN. 
From (1.2), (1.3) and the consistency of ~we obtain t1~1 (S) =  ~bl((tl,  1 ....  , 
1)Sr)  and  r  Cj((tl,  1, ...,  1)St) for all j ~  1.  Repeating the whole 
argument (n -- I) more times, we find t~b(Sr) --- ~b(tSr), proving (1.1). 
The  risk  sensitivity  axiom for the  2-person case states that, if a player is 
replaced  by a  more  risk  averse one, his opponent will not be worse off. At 
first  sight,  it  is  not  clear  how  this  property  should  be  extended  to  the  n- 
person case.  Must we require all opponents to be not worse off (n-person risk 
sensitivity),  or,  weaker,  must  we  require  that at least  one opponent be not 
worse  off  (risk  profit  opportunity,  cf.  Theorem  1.1)?  Theorem  1.2  above 
(in  comparison  with  the  mentioned  theorem  of  Kihlstrom,  Roth  and 
Schmeidler)  may  be  viewed  to  indicate  that  the  latter  one  of these  two 
questions  must  be  answered  in  the affirmative.  In the next section, we will 
elaborate  upon  these  questions  a  little  further,  and  in  Section  3,  we  will 
give examples of solutions which give substantial evidence for both questions 
to get a positive answer.  On the  other hand again, it may be argued from the 
results in the next section that property (P.1), the worse alternative property, 
is  basic,  and  then  that  the  second  question  must  be  answered  positively 
since, as we will see, the risk profit opportunity is closely related to the worse 
alternative  property.  Many  of these  nice  relations  break down when games 
with risky Pareto optimal outcomes are considered, as we will do in Section 
4.  All  these  considerations  pertain  to  Pareto  optimal  solutions,  but  Pareto 
optimality is a very natural property. 
2.  RISK PROPERTIES  OF SOLUTIONS DEFINED ON GAMES 
WITH RISKLESS PARETO OPTIMAL OUTCOMES 
Let  P  =  (A, ~, u I, u 2 .....  u n) be an n-person bargaining situation. We call an 
x  ESr  a riskless  (or certain)  outcome if x  =  u(a) for some a CA, otherwise 
we call x a risky outcome. We denote 
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So BSC n  is the  family of n-person bargaining situations with only certain (or 
riskless)  Pareto  optimal  outcomes  in  the  corresponding  bargaining  games. 
There are two reasons  for paying special attention  to this class of bargaining 
situations.  First,  there  is  a  mathematical  reason:  situations  (or games) with 
only  certain  Pareto  outcomes  behave  nicely  under  transformations  of the 
form K s. Secondly, there is the intuitive feeling that a Pareto optimal solution 
will  behave nicely if the solution  outcome is riskless.  At first sight, it seems 
strange  to study risk properties of solutions  in the limited case that  there is 
no risk involved in the  solution  outcome. An argument against this objection 
might be that  the behavior of a player, also in cases when there is actually no 
risk  involved,  is  influenced  by  his  overall  attitude  towards  risk.  In  other 
words,  a  risk  averse  player  may  suffer  (or  benefit)  from  his  reluctance  of 
taking risks also in these cases, when not much risk is involved. 
In  the  following  lemma,  we  collect  some  facts  mainly  w.r.t,  applying 
increasing  concave  transformations  on  the  utility  functions  of the  players 
in  a  bargaining  situation  in  BSC n.  We  first  introduce  some  additional 
notations,  and  a  definition.  For  P = (A, ~, u 1, u 2 .....  u n) EBS n,  i EN, 
k s E cs(p) and x  E  R n such that xs E conv(uS(A)), let 
Ki(xl, 2.. ,xs .....  xn) := (xl,...  ,XS-l,ki(xi),XS+l,  .  .-  ,Xn) 
and 
KS(T) := {KS(y): y  ~  T}, 
where TC  R n such thaty s E conv(ui(A)) for ally E  T. 
Further, the utopia point h(Sr) ('h' from 'heaven') is defined by 
hj (St) : =  max {xj : x  E Sr }. 
2.1.  LEMMA.  Let  P=(A,~,ul,u2,...,un)  EBSC n,  iEN,  kiECi(P), 
z E P(S  r). Then we have: 
(i) h (SKi(r)) = K i(h (St)), 
(ii) P(SKt(r)) = K*(P(Sr)), 
(iii) rr_ i {x E SKi(r): x i = ki(zi)} = ~-i {x E St: x s =  zs} , 
(iv) for allx,y ESr  and all/ENwith  xj ~<yj, we have 
T~-i{S ~Sr:  si =yj}C  7r_i {s CSr:  sj =xj}. 
Proof.  All  statements  follow  elementarily  from  the  definitions.  For  the 
proof  of (iii)  and  (iv),  we  essentially  need  property  (G.3) or, equivalently, 
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Our  main  results  in  this  section  are  brought  together in the  following 
theorem,  which  says  that for a  Pareto  optimal solution defined on games 
with only riskless  Pareto  optimal outcomes, risk sensitivity implies the risk 
profit  opportunity  property,  and  the  risk  profit  opportunity property  is 
equivalent to the worse alternative property. 
2.2.  THEOREM.  Let  the bargaining solution q~: BSC n -+ •'*  satisfy PO.  If 
satisfies RS, then ~b satisfies RPO, and r  satisfies RPO iff q~ satisfies WA. 
Proof  Let P =  (A, ~, u ~ , u 2 .....  u n) E BSC n, i E N, k i E Ci(P). 
(i)  Suppose ~b satisfies RS. We want to prove that ~b satisfies RPO, hence 
(2.1)  O_i(r , ~) c  O_i(Ki(p),  ~a). 
Note that (by 1.emma 2.10i) in particular) Ki(P) EBSC n. By PO and Lemma 
2.1(ii)  there  exists  an  element z EP(Sr)  such  that  ~b(Ki(P))=Ki(z).  By 
RS we have 
(2.2)  Cj(K*(P))  =  zj >  ~(P)  for all] EN\ {i}. 
Since z EP(Sr) and r  EP(Sr), (2.2) implies 
(2.3)  z~ ~< ~(r). 
By (2.3) and Lemma 2.1(iv) we obtain 
(2.4)  rr_ i {x E Sp:x i = ~bi(P)} C rr_i{x E Sr:x  i = zi}. 
By (2.4) and Lemma l(iii), we conclude that (2.1) holds. 
(ii)  Let  l,  m  EL(A)  with  ~(P)=u(l)  and  r  ..... 
kio ui(m) .....  un(m)). 
(a)  Suppose  r  satisfies  RPO,  we  want  to  prove  that ~b satisfies  WA. By 
RPO, 
(2.5)  O-i(P, q~) C  O_i(Ki(r), 0). 
First, take l, rn E A.  This is possible  since P, Ki(P) E BSC n  and ~b is Pareto 
optimal. Then, from (2.5), it follows that there exists a c EA with rr_i(u(c))>1 
rr_i(u(l))  and k i o ui(c) = k i o ui(m).  By PO, ui(c) <<, ui(l), hence k i o ui(m) <, 
kioui(l),  which  proves  (P.1)(ii),  i.e.,  the  second  statement  of  the  WA 
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Note  that  {aEA: u(a)EP(Sr)}=  {aEA:  (ul(a) .....  kSoui(a) ..... 
un(a))EP(S~i(r))}.  Call  this  set  P(A).  Let  Pr(L(A)) := {rEL(A): u(r)E 
P(Sr)}  and  PKS(pI(L(A)) := {r EL(A): (ul(r),...  , k s o uS(r) .....  un(r)) E 
"P(SKI(r))  }.  Every r EPKi(r)(L(A))  is  of the form r =  [pj, aJ]~=l  where a J E 
P(A).  Since  k s is  concave, we  then  have rEPr(L(A)),  otherwise  we  could 
find  a EA  with  u(a) >~ u(r),  u(a)--/=  u(r),  and  then  Ki(u(a)) >1 (ul(r),..., 
k s o uS(r) ....  , un(r)) C P(SKs(r)) with inequality, a contradiction. 
Now let r =  m  and c CA as above, i.e., rr_s(u(c)) >1 rr_ ~(u(l)) and k s o ui(c) = 
k s o uS(m), ui(c) <~ uS(l).  Let d CP(A) be such that u(d) =  u(m); such d exists 
since P C BSC n  and m C Pr(L(A )). Then, since d, m CPKS(r)(L(A ))  , we have 
k i o uS(d) = k s o uS(m) = k s o uS(c).  By definition of d, we have uS(d) = uS(m), 
and  since  d,  c CA,  we have  uS(d)= ui(c).  So ui(m) = uS(c), hence ut(m) <<, 
u~(l), which proves (P. 1)(i), the first statement of the WA property. 
(b)  Suppose  ~b  satisfies  WA.  Let  l,  m  be  as  above  with  l,  m CA.  Then 
uS(l) >>- uS(m) and so, by Lemma 2.1(iv) and Off), 
O_s(I', ~b) C ~r_s{x CSr: xs =  uS(m)}  =  O_s(Ki(P), qg). 
So ~ satisfies RPO.  [] 
Two corollaries now follow simply from the above theorem. 
2.3.  COROLLARY.  For a Pareto  optimal bargaining solution on BSC 2, the 
risk  sensitivity  property,  worse  alternative  property  and  risk  profit  oppor- 
tunity property are equivalent. 
Proof.  Let ~: BSC 2 -~ R 2  be Pareto  optimal. Then for q~, the implications 
RS =~ RPO ~, WA  follow  from  Theorem  2.2.  The  implication  RPO =~ RS 
follows immediately from PO.  [] 
2.4.  COROLLARY.  Let  4: BSCn ~  Rn  satisfy  PO  and  RS. Then ~ is scale 
transformation invariant. 
Proof.  By  Theorem  2.2,  ~  satisfies  RPO.  So  we  can  copy the  proof of 
Theorem  1.2 with BSC n  in the role ofBS*, noting that there the consistency 
of  ~b  is  only  used  to  conclude  from  (1.2)  that  r  c~j(Ti(F))  for  all 
] v  ~ i.  But  this  follows  also  straightforward  from risk  sensitivity  and Pareto 
optimality,  o RISK AVERSION IN n-PERSON  BARGAINING  59 
The  results  of  this  section  (and  Theorem  1.2)  are  summarized  in  the 
following diagram, which holds for a Pareto optimal solution on BSC  n. 
n=2 
( 
RS  .),  RPO(::~WA 
STI  ( 
Con 
A  verbal  summary of these results  is as follows.  Suppose  r  BSC  n ~  Nn  is a 
Pareto  optimal  solution.  If n =  2,  and  ~b satisfies  one of the  properties  RS, 
RPO and WA, then replacing one  of the players by a more risk averse player, 
does not make his opponent worse off, in a bargaining situation. That player 
himself, and his more risk averse substitute, both (possibly nonstrictly) prefer 
at least  one alternative  giving rise  to the  solution outcome in the game with 
the less risk averse player, to at least one alternative giving rise to the solution 
outcome  in  the game with the more risk averse player.  For more discussion 
on this last point, we refer to the  final  section.  If n >  2, then all opponents 
of a player who is replaced by a more risk averse substitute, are not worse off 
if r  is risk sensitive; and either the solution outcome remains the same for all 
opponents  or  at  least  one  of them is really better off, if ~b satisfies  RPO or 
WA (cf Theorem  1.1).  With respect to the replaced player and his substitute, 
the same holds as in the case n  =  2. 
Thus,  in  the  2-person  case,  RS,  RPO  and  WA  are  one  and  the  same 
property.  RS  is  a  strong,  and  RPO  or  WA  a  weak  generalization  of this 
property  for  n  >  2.  Finally,  scale  transformation  invariance  is  a  necessary 
condition  for  risk  sensitivity,  and  an  'almost'  necessary  condition  for  risk 
profit opportunity. 
The next section will provide several examples which fit in this diagram. 
3.  RISK PROPERTIES  OF IIA- AND IM-SOLUTIONS 
We  first  consider  bargaining  solutions  ~b: BS n ~  ~n  with  the  following 
property, which was introduced by Nash (1950). 
(P.4)  ~b is  called  independent of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) if ~b(S) = 
r  for all S, TEB n with S C  Tand ~b(T) ES. 60  HANS PETERS AND STEF TIJS 
There have been many discussions  on this axiom in literature, see e.g., Raiffa 
(1953)  or  Kalai  and  Smorodinsky  (1975).  We  will  not  add  another one. 
Our first result is 
3.1.  THEOREM.  Let  r  Bsn--> R n  be  a  bargaining  solution satisfying PO, 
STI and IIA. Then ~b has the risk profit opportunity property on BSC  n. 
Proof.  Let  FEBSC  n,  iEN,  kiECi(p).  Put  z  :=~b(P),  2  :=~(K/(F)). 
We wish to prove 
(3.1)  O_/(r,r 
First suppose that 2/= 0. Then (3.1) follows by applying I_emma 2.1 (i/i) and 
(iv). Next suppose 2/> 0. In view of Lemma 2.1 (ii) there is a unique point y 
in P(Sv) with zr_i(y) = 7r_/(2). Since r  satisfies STI, we may suppose 
(3.2)  (2  =)Ki(y)  = y. 
The concavity of the function k/, (3.2) and k/(0) = 0 then imply 
(3.3)  k~(X)/> ;k  for all )t E  [0,y/],  ki(~.) ~< ~.  for all ~ f>yi. 
Suppose that 2/> z/(~> 0) and let 
T  :=  {xERn: O<,x<.sforsomesEconv{O,z,2}}. 
Then  T EB  n, and T C Sp  since 2 E Sp by (3.2), T C S/r  since z E S/d~r) 
by  (3.3).  So  by  IIA,  ~b(T)= z = 2  contradicting  our  assumption  2  i >  z i. 
Hence, 2/~< z/, and then, by (3.2) and Lemma 2.1 (iv) we conclude that (3.1) 
holds. 
An  obvious question is:  are there any IIA-solutions r  as in Theorem 3.1 
which are also  risk sensitive? We will  give a detailed answer to that question, 
and  therefore  we  first  introduce  a  well-characterized  family  of n-person 
IIA-solutions. We start with the following definition. 
DEFINITION. A  weighted ordered partition of N  is an object H of the form 
H=  (N  1, 601,N2,602 ....  ,N  z, 60z), where  (N1,N  2  ....  ,N  z)  is  an  ordered 
partition  of N  (without  empty  elements),  and,  for  every i =  1, 2 ....  , l, 
601E R n  such  that co} =  0 if ] ~ N/, 60} >  0 if ] E N/, and E~=I 60} =  1. N / is 
called the  i-th  class of H. ]t  aN  denotes the  family of all weighted ordered 
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To every HEff~  N,  H=  <N  1, col,A  p, w 2 .....  N t, co  t) we associate an n- 
person bargaining solution r  as follows. Let, for S  E B n, 
O3 !  S 1 := arg max {I/tEN 1 X  t  ': X EP(S)}. 
Let, for ]  =  2, 3 .....  l, 
S j  := arg max { IIi~gj xWi: x  C S j-1 },where 
29  j  := {i E N i; there is an x E S j-m such that xt >  0}. 
Then S t  consists  of exactly  one  point, say z, and we define cH(s) := z. In 
Peters  (1983) it is proved that  {r  B n  __> Rn: HE,~t,,N}  is the family of all 
n-person bargaining solutions satisfying PO, STI, IIA and Con. 
If N={1,2},  andH=(N,~X  1~)  cH  ~, ~),  then  is  the  (2-person symmetric) 
Nash  solution  [see  Nash  (1950)].  If H=  (N, (t, 1 --t))  for some t E(0, 1), 
then  4~  n  is  a  nonsymmetric  Nash  solution, see Harsanyi and  Selten (1972). 
If H=({a},  (1,0),  {2},  (0, 1))  (({2},  (0, 1),  {1},  (1,0)))  then  q~n is  the 
dictator  solution  for  player  1  (2),  see  deKoster  et  al.  (1983).  We  have 
enumerated  all  2-person  IIA-solutions,  since,  in  the  two-person  case,  con- 
sistency is guaranteed by Pareto optimality. 
There do exist solutions q5  n  which are risk sensitive on BSC n.  This is the 
content of the following proposition. We denote by e i the vector in R" with 
i-th coordinate equal to 1 and all other coordinates equal to 0. 
3.2.  PROPOSITION.  Let HEco'g  aN. Then: 
(i)  If H=  ({zr(1)},  e ~rO),  {7r(2)},  e~r(2),...,  {or(n)},  e 7r{n)) for  some  per- 
mutation 7r: N ~  N, then ~b  n  is risk sensitive on BSC n . 
(ii)  If H  =  ({7r(1)}, e ~r(1), {lr(2)}, eTr{2),..., {Tr(n -- 2)}, e rr(n-2), {Tr(n -- 1), 
7r(n)}, ~e  ~r(n-1) +  (1 -- c~) e ~r{n)) for some permutation zr: N ~  N  and c~ E (0, 1 ), 
then q~zr is risk sensitive on BSC n . 
Proof.  Let r' E BSC n. 
(i) Let zr be a permutation  of N, and let H  be as in (i) above. If a player, 
say 7r(i) for i EN, is replaced by a more risk averse player, then, by definition 
of q~n, the solution outcome changes only (possibly) for player 7r(i). So ~n is 
risk sensitive on BSC n. 
(ii)  Let rr be a  permutation  of N, and let H  be as in (ii) above. If a player 
lr(i),  i <  n -- 1,  is  replaced  by  a  more  risk  averse  player,  then  the solution 
outcome  predicted  by  r  changes  only (possibly) for player lr(i).  If player 
rr(n-  1)  (~r(n)) is  replaced  by  a  more  risk  averse player, then the solution 
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(cf.  Theorem  3.1) and  PO, the  solution  outcome for player rr(n) (rr(n -- 1)) 
may change only to his advantage. So q~H is risk sensitive on BSC  n.  t~ 
In  particular,  Proposition  3.2  implies  that  every  2-person  solution  cH 
is  risk  sensitive  on  BSC 2.  This  result  also  follows  from  Theorem  3.1  and 
Corollary 2.3. 
Not  every  solution  r  is  risk  sensitive  on BSC n. This will be shown by 
the following example. 
3.3.  EXAMPLE.  Let P E BSC 3 such that Sr =  S where 
S  :-- conv {(0, 0, 0), (1,0, 0), (1,0,  1), (0, 0, 1), (0, 1,0)}. 
Then P(S) =  cony {({3, 1, 0), (1, 0, t)}. Let k 3 E C3(F)be defined by k 3 (X) = 
x/X for all X E  [0, 1].  Then SK30,) =  K3(S)and p(K3(S))= {(a, 1 --a, x/a): 
olE [0, 1]}. 
(i)  Let  HE/~(  ~N,  H=({1,2,3},66),  hence  r  Straightforward  cal- 
culations  show:  6ol +  663 =  q~f(S)> c~H(K3(S))= (2661 +  663)(2 --603) -1, 
hence r  is not risk sensitive. 
(ii)  Let H E r  'N, H  =  ({2, 3 }, 66, {1 }, (1,0, 0)) hence 66 =  (0,602,663)>~ 
0  with  6o2, 66~ :P 0  and  662  +  663  =  1.  Again,  straightforward  calculations 
show: 
663  =  Of(S) > ~f(K3(S))  =  663(1  +  662) -1, 
hence also this cH is not risk sensitive. 
We  use  Example  3.3  to  show  that  the  converse  of Proposition  3.2  also 
holds. More specifically, we have the following theorem. 
3.4.  THEOREM.  Let H Eo~r "iv, then,  on BSC n, ~H is risk sensitive iff H  is 
as in Proposition 3.20) or (ii). 
Proof.  In view of Proposition  3.2, we  still have to prove:  if His not as in 
3.2(i) or (ii), then q~n is not risk sensitive. Let H  =  (N 1 , 6o 1 , N 2, 60  2 ,...,  N t, 
w z) where  I <~n -- 1. W.l.o.g. we may suppose:  if i EN h,/" EN m , then i <] 
for  all  i, ] EN  and  1 ~  h <  m ~  l. The assumption that H  is not  as in Prop- 
osition 3.2 implies that either 
Case 1:  ],] +  1,] + 2 CN  h  for somej CNand  1 <~h ~  l, RISK  AVERSION  IN n-PERSON  BARGAINING  63 
or 
Case 2:  ],] +  1 E N h and ] +  2 E N h+l for some ] E N and 1 ~< h ~< l-  1. 
First,  let H  be  as in  case  1,  and  SEB  a  as in Example 3.3.  Let TEB n be 
defined by 
T:=  {x ERn:  (xj,xj+I,xi+2) ES, xiE  [0, 1] ifi--/:],]+  1,]+ 2}. 
Then P(T) =  {x E T:  (xi, xj+l, xj+2) EP(S), xi =  1 ifi =/=],] +  1,] + 2}. Let 
k j+2  be as k 3 in Example 3.3. Then a straighforward calculation shows, just 
as in Example 3.3, that q~i (T) >  ~b~(K  j+2 (T)). Hence qfl is not risk sensitive. 
Next, if H  is as in Case 2, then apply a similar argument as in Case 1, now 
using  part (ii) of Example 3.3  with the players ], ] +  1, ] +  2 in the roles of 
the  players 2, 3,  i, respectively, in Example 3.3.  This also leads to the con- 
clusion that cH is not risk sensitive.  D 
Theorem 3.4  shows  that  only a  relatively small subclass  {r  HE,~,aN} 
consists  of  risk  sensitive  solutions.  This  subclass  consists of n!  dictatorial 
solutions  and  a  family of almost-dictatorial solutions  each one  determined 
by a number in (0, 1) and an ordered partition of N out of ￿89  possible ones, 
as  Proportion  3.2  shows. We  conclude  this  first  part  of Section  3  with an 
example of a  bargaining  solution  which  satisfies RPO,  but  not  RS,  STI or 
Con. 
3.5.  EXAMPLE.  Let  the  PO-solution  r  BS 3 ~  R a  be  defined  as  follows. 
For each F EBS 3, we def'me r  := z with zl  := max {xl: x EP(Sr)} and 
with  (z2,z3)  maximizing  the  expression  .~.2~3vt~l-t on  {x ~e(Sr): x 1 =gl} 
where t E  [0, 1) is such that t(1 -- 0 -1  = z 2. 
On BSC 3 , this r  satisfies RPO but not STI, and hence not Con nor RS. To 
see  that  r  satisfies RPO,  check that,  if player  1 is replaced by a more risk 
averse  player,  then  the  opportunity  set 0_ 1  for players 2  and  3  does not 
change.  If player 2 (or 3) is replaced by a more risk averse player, then the 
RPO statement follows in fact from Theorem 3.1  applied for n =  2 (players 
2  and 3), noting that for player 1 then nothing changes. The solution r  does 
not  satisfy STI  since  the  parameter t may change if we apply a scale trans- 
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Next  we  consider  solutions  satisfying the  following axiom, which was 
introduced by Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975) in its two-person version. 
(P.5)  A  solution ~: B n  -+ R n  is  called  individually  monotonic  (IM) if 
for every iEN  and  all S,  TEB  n  with S C T and hi(S)  =  hi(T ) 
for every] EN\ {i} we have r  <<, el(T). 
3.6.  THEOREM.  Let ~: BS n  ~  R n  satisfy PO,  STI, IM. Then r  is risk sen- 
sitive on BSC n . 
Proof.  Let F ETBSC ~  and k i E Ci(F). We want to prove 
(3.4)  Cj(Ki(F))>~r  for all] ~  i. 
In view of STI, we may suppose 
(3.5)  hi(St)  =  hi(SKi(r)). 
Then (3.5), the concavity of k i and Lemma 2.1(i) and (ii) imply 
(3.6)  Sr C Sgicr )  and  h(Sr)  =  h(SKi(r)). 
Now (3.6) and IM imply r  ~< r  and in particular (3.4).  [] 
Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975) used the individual monotonicity property 
to  characterize  the  (symmetric, 2-person)  Raiffa  solution  [Raiffa (1953)]. 
Peters  and  Tijs  (1982b)  characterized  a  family of (PO, STI) IM-solutions, 
defined on a subclass ofB  n, for n 1> 2. 
Kihlstrom  et  aL  (1981)  proved that the (2.person  symmetric) solutions 
of Perles  and  Maschler  (1981),  Nash  (1950)  and  Kalai  and Smorodinsky 
(1975)  are  risk  sensitive  (in games with riskless  Pareto  optimal outcomes). 
Further results on risk sensitivity, covered as special results by the results in 
this paper, were  obtained by Peters and Tijs (1981,  1982a,  1982b).  Nielsen 
(1983)  shows  that  the  (3-person,  symmetric) Nash-solution (the  solution 
~b  H  with n  = ({1, 2, 3},  (￿89189189 in our notation) is not risk sensitive, but 
does have some property like the worse alternative property. He also shows 
that  the  n-person  Kalai-Smorodinsky  solution  (the  unique  symmetric 
solution in Theorem 3.6) is risk sensitive.  So his results constitute particular 
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Tijs  and  Peters  (1983)  relate  the  properties  (P.I)-(P.3)  to  some  other 
properties  for  bargaining  solutions,  especially  a  property  called  twist  sen- 
sitivity. 
In  Kannai  (1977),  Crawford  and  Varian  (1979)  and  Sobel  (1981),  the 
strategic  question  is  considered,  whether  or  not  it  is  advantageous  for  a 
player to pretend to be more risk  averse in a bargaining game. All mentioned 
results  pertain  to  solutions  defined  on  games  with  riskless  Pareto  optimal 
outcomes. 
We conclude this  section by extending the  diagram of Section 2 with the 
results  of this  section. We now take the diagram to hold for a Pareto optimal, 
scale transformation invariant solution on BSC n. 
1M =~ RS 
n=2 
RP0 r  WA 
IIA 
4.  RISK PROPERTIES  OF  SOLUTIONS DEFINED ON GAMES 
WITH RISKY PARETO OPTIMAL OUTCOMES 
Let  P =  (A, ~,//i,  U 2 .....  U  n)  be an n-person bargaining situation.  Suppose 
for a moment that  F  satisfies (S.1) and (S.3), but not (S.2) and (S.4), which 
implies  that  S r  C  R~  does  not  hold  anymore.  If we  still  have  that  every 
Pareto optimal point  of S r  is riskless then, after a few modifications of some 
of the definitions, the results of the preceding sections can be shown to retain 
their validity.  This is  due to the  fact that,  when we apply an increasing con- 
cave  transformation  on  the  utilities  of one  of the  playsers such that  a new 
situation Ki(F) arises, then the intersection  SKi(r ) r  R n  is completely deter- 
mined  by the  map K i  and  S r  (~ R n.  If, however,  Sr  has also risky Pareto 
optimal poi/~ts,  then it may happen  that SKi(r ) N  R n  depends also on points 
which are not in S r  f~ ~ +~. In fact, we have the following general 'impossibility' 
result,  where,  for a  situation  P,  a  player  iEN,  and  a  solution  r  the  def- 
inition of the opportunity set is modified to 
O_i(P , dp)  :=  {yE~n-l:  O~ y~Tr_i(X ) 
for some x E Sv A R 7 with x i =  r 66  HANS  PETERS  AND  STEF TIJS 
For  P EBS n  (satisfying  (S.1)-(S.4)), this  definition is equal to the  original 
one. 
4.1.  THEOREM.  Let ~ be a Pareto optimal solution, defined on the  family 
of bargaining  situations  satisfying  (S.1) and (S.3). Suppose ~ is individually 
rational, i.e., ~(Sr) >~ 0  for each P in its domain. Then ~b satisfies none of the 
properties RS, RPO, WA. 
Proof..  Let  ["=(A,a, ul,u 2)  where  A  =  {ct, al,a 2 }  and  uiEU(A)  are 
defined by 
ui(~)  =  O, ut(a j)  =  -l  ifi--/:j, ui(a i)  =  2,  foralli, j=l,2. 
Let, for i =],  2, the vectors e  i and x i in R 2 be defined by 
x}  =  uJ(ai),e~  =  l  if/=i,e}=Oif]--/:i,  forall/=l,2. 
Then 
S r  =  cony {0, x I , x 2 }, P(Sr) =  cony {x 1 , x2}, e(Sr) 0  R n  = 
=  cony {e  1  , e 2 }. 
Let,  for  every  3 ~  (￿89 2],  the  increasing  concave  function  ka:  ~  ~  R  be 
defined by 
kO(t)  =  t for all t E (--0% 0], k~(2)  =  3, k2 is linear on [0, oo). 
Let, for every 3 E (￿89 
S ~  =  cony{0, x 1, (x  2, k~(x22)} =  cony {0, (2,-  1), (- 1,3)}. 
Note that the set  {x ~ P(St3): x ~> 0} shrinks to {0} if 13 decreases to ￿89 There- 
fore, if we suppose  for a moment that r  satisfies RS, RPO or WA, we must 
have  that  r  e 2=  (0, 1).  By  a  similar  argument,  r  e 1,  a  con- 
tradiction. So r  satisfies none of the properties RS, RPO or WA.  [] 
Roth  and  Ro(hblum  (1982)  studied  the  risk  behavior  of the  (2-person, 
symmetric)  Nash  solution  (the  solution  r  corresponding  to H=  ({1,2}, 
(￿89 ￿89  in  our notation) in games with risky Pareto optimal outcomes. They 
reached  the  following, inexhaustive  result.  Let  the  more  risk  averse  player 
replace player 2. If the solution in the game with player 2 is obtained by a 
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agreement alternative,  then player  1 is not worse off when bargaining against 
instead  of 2, and  player 2 prefers his solution outcome to the one obtained 
by  2.  If  the  solution  in  the  game  with  player  2  is  obtained  by  a  lottery 
between  two riskless alternatives  one  of which is less preferred by 2 than the 
disagreement  alternative,  then  player  1 is better  off when bargaining against 
2  instead  of 2,  etc.  So  there  is  one intermediate  case which is not  covered 
by this result. 
It is even worse when we consider  individually  monotonic  solutions,  e.g., 
the  Kalai-Smorodinsky  solution.  Then  all  regularities  are  lost,  since  the 
utopia  point (which must  be taken with respect  only to outcomes ~> 0) may 
change  unpredictably,  if we  apply  an  increasing  concave  transformation  to 
the utility function of one of the players (see, e.g., the game used in the proof 
of the previous theorem). 
In  the  remainder  of this  section,  we  will  restrict  attention  again to bar- 
gaining situations in BS n, i.e., satisfying (S.1)-(S.4). 
We  first consider individually  monotonic  solutions,  and  give a result very 
much resembling Theorem 3.6. We will only shortly outline the proof. 
4.2.  THEOREM.  Let  4: BS n ~'~  be  a  solution  satisfying  PO,  STI  and 
IM.  Then  q~ is  risk  sensitive,  has  the  risk  profit opportunity  property, and, 
furthermore,  the  following  statement  holds:  for  I" =  (A, d, u x, ...,  u n) E 
BS n, i EN,  k i E ci(p),  we  have  ui(l) >~ ui([)  if l, i EL(A)  with u(1) =  ~b(P) 
and  (ul(l) .....  ui-l(l),  k io ui(1),  uS§  .....  un(l)) =  ~b(Ki(l"))  where,  of 
course, k i o ui(l) denotes the expected utility of l. 
Proof.  Let P, i, k i, l, and l, be as in the theorem. By STI, we may suppose 
kS(hi(St))  = hi(St).  Then,  the  concavity  of k s implies that kS(uS(a)) >~ uS(a) 
for all a EA.  Note  that, since k is increasing, u(a) EP(Sr)  implies KS(u(a)) E 
P(S/d(r))  for all a EA. Now let TC R n be defined by 
T  =  {y E Nn: 0 ~<y ~< x  for some x E  conv {Ki(u(a)): 
a EA with u(a)EP(Sr)}}. 
Then S r  C  T c  Sid(p~. So we can repeat  the  proof of Theorem 3.6 to obtain 
that  q~ is risk sensitive and has the RPO property. Particularly, we have uJ(l) <~ 
u J(1) for all j  4= i, which by PO implies ui(l) >i ui(1).  [] 68  HANS PETERS AND STEF TIJS 
Notice, that the last statement of Theorem 4.2 is property (P.1)(i), hence 
only one half of the  worse  alternative  property. The other half of the WA 
property, which is a statement about the more risk averse substitute of player 
i, indeed does not hold any more. We give the following example. 
4.3.  EXAMPLE.  Let  ['EBS  2  be  defined  by  P=(A,d,  ul,u 2)  with  A = 
{~, a 1, a 2, a a },  u(~) = (0, 0),  u(a') = (1,0),  u(a  z) = (0, 1),  and  u(a  a) = 
(~,~).  Let  k 2 EC2(P)  be  defined by k2(0)=0,  k2(1)= 1,  k2(-~) =~. 
(One may take  k 2  linear on  [0, a~]  and on  [~, 1], but this is immaterial.) 
The Kalai-Smorodinsky solution assigns to S r  the outcome (￿89189  which can 
(only) be  obtained by the  lottery l =  rl  _1. x  _21  t~,u  ,~,u  ], and  to Sty(r) the out- 
come (~, I~) which  can only be obtained by the-riskless alternative 1 = a a. 
Now  note  that  k 2 ou2(l)=￿89  2 ou2(al)+￿89  :  ouz(a2)=￿89  whereas 
k z o u2(l)= k 2 o u2(_a  a) =~.  So  the  more risk  averse  player 2 prefers 'his' 
alternative l to the 'original' alternative l. 
[The Kalai-Smorodinsky solution is  obtained by intersecting the Pareto 
surface  with  the  straight  line  through  the  disagreement  outcome and  the 
utopia point.] 
Property (P.1)(i), the property stated in the last part of theorem 4.2, will 
be  called  the  weak  worse  alternative  property  (WWA).  The  proof of the 
following theorem has  already been  given,  in  the  last  part  of the proof of 
Theorem 4.2. 
4.4.  THEOREM.  Let ~b: BS  n ~  R n  be a Pareto optimal solution. If ~b is risk 
sensitive, then ~b has the weak worse alternative property. 
The proof of the following lemma has, for the symmetric case, been given 
by Roth and  Rothblum (1982). For the nonsymmetric case, see Peters and 
Tijs (1981). 
4.5.  LEMMA.  Let ~b: BS  2 ~  R 2 satisfy PO, STI and IIA. Then q~ satisfies  RS, 
RPO and WWA. 
For a  description of the  solutions for which Lemma 4.5 applies, see the 
previous section. With the  aid  of this lemma, it is straightforward to show RISK AVERSION  IN n-PERSON  BARGAINING  69 
that  Proposition  3.2  still holds in BS n  (Lemma 4.5 takes the role of Theorem 
3.1  in the  proof of that  proposition).  Hence, also Theorem 3.4  still holds in 
BS  n, since BSC"  C  BS n . Summarizing, we have the following result. 
4.6.  THEOREM.  Let  HEn  N,  then,  on  BS n,  0 z-z is  risk  sensitive  iffH= 
({7r(17} ,  e ~r(1),  {1r(2)},  e ~r(z) .....  {7r(n)},  e ~r(n))  or H  =  ({Tr(17},  e "(1) ..... 
{rc(n -- 2)},  e ~r(n-u),  {7r(n -- 17,  7r(n)},  ad r(n-1) +  (1 -- a)e rr('O)  for some per- 
mutation rr of N  and a E (0, 1). 
The  question  which  now  arises  of  course  is,  whether  a  (PO, STI)  IIA- 
solution  has  the  risk  profit  opportunity  property  or  the  worse  alternative 
property  also  on the  family BS n  (cf. Theorem 3.17. We  did not manage yet 
to obtain a nice, overall result  like in Theorem  3.1,  but  we have strong trial- 
and-error indications for the following conjecture. 
4.7.  CONJECTURE.  Let 4: Bsn  "~ A  n  be a PO, STI, IIA bargaining solution. 
Then 4 has the weak worse alternative property on BS n . 
In  Conjecture  4.7,  WWA  may not  be replaced  by WA (take, in Example 
4.3,  the  (symmetric)  Nash  solution  instead  of the  Kalai  and  Smorodinsky 
solution). 
In Theorem 4.4  we saw that for Pareto optimal solutions, WWA is implied 
by  RS.  Probably,  WWA  is  not  equivalent  to RPO (as might  be conjectured 
from  the  relationships  established  in  Section  2  for solutions  on BSCn).  To 
illustrate  this,  we  give  the  following  example,  assuming  for a  moment  that 
Conjecture 4.7 is indeed true. 
4.8.  EXAMPLE.  Let  4 =  4 H  with  H=  ({1,2, 3},  (￿89  1  7,7)),  so  4  is  the 
symmetric  3-person  'Nash-sotution'.  Let  P  =  ( A , 5, u 1, u 2, u a) ~  BS a  with 
A  =  {5, aZ,a2,a3,a4},  u(~)=(0,0,0),  u(al)=e  1,  u(a2)=e 2,  u(aa)=e a, 
u(a  4)  11  Id  =(~,~,~7.  Let  @Ca(F)  with  k(0)=0,  k(~)=~,  k(1)=￿89  Then 
r  =  (~  1  1  , ~,7)  and  also  4(S/<~(r)) =  (~,~,￿89  Both  outcomes  can  be 
obtained  by the  alternative a 4 . However, O-a (P, 4) =  cony {(0, 0), (~, 0), (0, 
~)} and  O-3 (Ka(P), 4) =  cony {(0, 07,  (0, ~7,  (~, 07,  (~, ￿89  So  O-a (Ka(F), 
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We  conclude this  section by remarking that, in general, the risky case is 
much less easier to handle than the riskless case of the preceding sections, and 
that less nice relations between the several risk properties exist. 
5.  FINAL  COMMENTS 
First,  we  give  an  example  which  may  clarify  why property (P.1)(ii), the 
statement of the WA property for the  more risk  averse  player, is put in a 
weaker fashion that property (P.1)(i), the statement of the WA property for 
the  less  risk  averse  player,  who  has  been  replaced  by a  more risk  averse 
substitute. 
5.1.  EXAMPLE.  Let r  =  (A, 5, ul, u 2) E BSC 2 and k 2  E  C 2 (F) where: 
A  =  {(0, 0)}U conv {(1, 0), (0, 1)} C •2, 
ui(a)  =  7r_j(a)  for all i,] =  1,2 
with  i~j  and aEA;  and k2(t)=x/t  for all  tE [0, 1].  Let $  be  the  sym- 
metric  Nash  solution, i.e., ~b = q~n where H= ({1, 2}, (￿89189  Then ~Sr)= 
=  (:~, :~), and  ~(SK~(r)) =  q~(conv({(0, 0)} U  ~(conv {(0, 0),  (0,1),  (1,0)})  1  1 
{(t, X/1 -- t): t E  [0, 1] })) =  (~, ~X/3). Now ~(Sr) may be obtained by taking 
the  utilities of the  riskless  alternative  i  (~, ~) E A, and ~SK~(r)) is uniquely 
obtained by taking the utilities of the riskless alternative (~, ~) EA. Player 2 
in  K2(F)  prefers  i  1  (:, :)  over (~, ~) (￿89  >  ~X/3).  However, the  solution 
specifies only utilities, not alternatives. So (by some rule or another) r 
may be only payable by the lottery [￿89 (1,0); ￿89  1)]. Now, player 2 prefers 
2  1  (~, ~) EA over this lottery (~X/3 >  ￿89 
So, the  same  indeterminateness of ~ which, in a different context, leads 
to  the  'Shapley paradox' in  ordinal bargaining (see Section 1), leads to the 
'paradox' of this example. 
Secondly:  the  most  serious  restriction  we  have  put  on our  domain of 
bargaining games, is  the  restriction of these  games  to  the  positive orthant. 
For games with only riskless  Pareto optimal outcomes, this restriction is not 
very material, as we have remarked before, in Section 4. However, we exclude 
some very interesting games,  where bargaining may be over lotteries between 
alternatives, some  of which may be very favorable to  some of the players, RISK AVERSION IN n-PERSON BARGAINING  71 
but  quite  unfavorable  (i.e., less  preferred  than  disagreement) to  the  other 
players. We can hardly hope to establish many general results concerning risk 
properties of solutions defined also on these types of games; still, it may be 
worthwhile to consider them. 
Finally, it  may be  worthwhile  to consider, instead of n-person pure bar- 
gaining games as  in this  paper,  the  general case  of n-person games without 
sidepayments, where coalition building is allowed. 
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